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Voting trust has become the worldwide tool for Minority-shareholder protecting. 
Different from other indirect ways to vote，voting trust can aggregate the voting right 
of Minority-shareholder，making the vulnerable Minority-shareholder has a chance to 
constrain the Controlling shareholders，protecting Minority-shareholder’s interests. As 
an effective way to solve the problem that voting right of Minority-shareholder being 
deprived，voting trust should be introduced in China. 
The dissertation generally includes three parts：preface、text and conclusion. As 
for the text，it consists of four chapters.   
Chapter one illustrates the ownership structure of public company in China， 
points out that the ownership structure of public company in China develops in an 
extreme way. And Minority-shareholder bears the oppression from both Controlling 
shareholder and the management of Public Company. 
Chapter two makes inquiry on the voting right of the Minority-shareholder. It 
contains two parts, one analyzes the defects of the voting system in China，the other 
uses the empirical method to proves that voting right of Minority-shareholder being 
asleep. 
Chapter three analyzes the value of voting trust through the comparison among 
the indirect ways to vote. Voting trust has the nature advantage while dealing with the 
absence of voting right of Minority-shareholder in China. It not only raised the 
efficiency of voting，but also making the voting right of Minority-shareholder awake. 
Chapter four tries to design the framework of voting trust in China，including the 
validity of voting trust and the parties’ right. The text points out that to take effect 
voting trust must satisfy both the format and substance elements. Voting trust contract 
decides the relationship of the parties. The system of voting trust is a both strict and 
flexible institution，which provides freedom of corporate autonomy. 
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第一章  我国上市公司股权结构评述 
 













据统计，2007 年新入市的投资者平均每天 13 万户， 多的时候 90 多万户。
从投资者结构看，持股市值 100 万元以下的投资者，持股账户数占 99.4%，参与
交易的账户数占 96.6%，交易金额约占 75%，持股市值 50%。①虽然个人持股数
额较低，但因中小投资者数量庞大，其所持股总量较大，已成为资本市场的重要
资金来源渠道。根据深交所发布的《2007 深圳证券市场概况》，截至 2007 年 12





                                                        
① 深交所宋丽萍副总经理在投资者教育月活动新闻发布会上的讲话[EB/OL]. 
http：//www.szse.cn/main/aboutus/bsyw/2007112611650.shtml，2007-12-18. 




















通股在股票总发行股本中占比达 56.2%，2006 年为 50.5%，至 2007 年下降至
45.7%，①可见，尽管非流通股比重逐年下降，但额度仍然偏大，仍有相当一部分
上市公司未完成股改，国有股一股独大、法人股不能上市流通状况依然存在。通
过中国证监会的统计资料可知，截至 2004 年 5 月底，我国共有 1324 家上市公司，

















                                                        
① 深圳证券交易所市场统计年鉴 2005，深圳证券交易所市场统计年鉴 2006，2007 年深圳证券市场概况
[EB/OL].http：//www.szse.cn/，2008-1-30. 
② 朱慈蕴.资本多数决与控制股东的诚信义务[J].法学研究，2004，(4)：105. 
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